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THE QUALIFICATION, CLASSIFICATION, OR 
CHARACTERIZATION PROBLEM IN 
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
By ERNEST G. LORENZENt 
I. 
THE problem in the Conflict of Laws which today is known on the 
continent as the problem of "qualification" and in recent Anglo-American 
literature as that of "classification" or "cl1aracterization" was brought 
to the attention of students of the Conflict of Laws fifty years ago. In 
the very year of the founding of the YALE LAw JOURNAL, Franz Kahn 
published an article in Jhering's Iahrbiic/1Cr1 in which he pointed out 
that even if the rules of the Conflict of Laws in the different countries 
were the same, identity of results in individual cases would not follow 
because of latent conflicts inherent in the different systems of law. 
Bartin dealt with the same problem in 1897, under the title De l'im-
possibilite d'arriver a la suppression definitive des conjlits de lois~ ap-
parently unaware of tl1e fact that Kalm l1ad written on tlte subject before 
him. Bartin spoke of the problem as one of "qualification," and since 
that time the problem has been known on tlte continent by that name.2 
There is no agreement among the writers concerning tlte type of ques-
tions properly belonging to a discussion of the qualification problem. 
Some use the term in a very broad sense and others in a narrower sense. 
I shall deal with the following classes of cases: 
( 1) The first class is one in which the fact situation is cl1aracterized 
under the law of the forum in a way different from that in which it is 
characterized under the lex causae- tl1e law of tl1e state or country with 
which it is connected. It may be regarded by one law as presenting a 
question of contracts and by the other law as a question of torts or prop-
erty, by one law as a question of matrimonial property and by tl1e oilier 
t Edward J. Phelps Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
1. Kahn, Gesetzeskollisiouen: Ei1~ Beitrag .::ur Lellre des iuten:atioualen Privat-
rechts (1891) 30 ]HERING's ]AHRBUCHER FUR DIE DooMATIK DES HEUTIGEN RomscnE:: 
PIUVATRECHTS 1, reprinted in LENEL & LEWALD, ABRANDLUNGEN ZUM n:ttm:Ano::.u.ru: 
PRIVATRECHT (1928) 1. 
2. 24 Ounet 225. Beckett was the first to suggest that "classification" was lin-
guistically a better term in English than "qualification." Tile Question of Classification 
(''Qualification") in Private bllematioual Law (1934) 15 BRIT. Y. B. hrr. L. 46, n. 3. 
Falconbridge regards the term "characterization" as the most suitable English word. 
Characterization In The Conflict of Laws (1937) 53 L. Q. REv. 235, 239, n. 17. Nuss-
baum admits that "characterization" is linguistically more correct, but thinks that the 
internationally accepted technical term "qualification" should be gi\'en preference in a 
discussion of international import. Book Review (1940) 40 CoL. L. REv. 1461, n. 2. 
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law as a question of succession, by one law as a question of succession 
and by the other law as a question of administration. Because of these 
divergencies in classification, different rules of the Conflict of Laws may 
become applicable. The problem is whether the qualification or charac-
terization is to be made on the basis of the law of the forum or on 
that of the foreign law. 
The same problem may also arise in situations in which the law of 
the forum and that of the foreign country differ as to whether certain 
property is movable or immovable, or in which they differ on questions 
of capacity and form. Are these questions to be resolved on the basis 
of the law of the forum or on the basis of the foreign law? 
( 2) The second class of cases involves the qualification of the con-
necting factor. A choice-of-law rule of the forum may determine legal 
relations by reference to the law of domicile, the law of the place of 
contracting, the law of the place of performance, or the law of the place 
where the tort is committed. The terms "domicile," "place of contract-
ing," "place of performance," or "place of the wrong" are here con-
necting factors. The law of the forum and the foreign law involved 
may have the same connecting factors in their systems of the Conflict 
of Laws but different meanings may be attached to them. Here again 
the question is whether the meaning of these connecting factors should 
be determined in the light of the law of the forum or of the foreign law. 
( 3) A third class of cases arises after the applicable foreign law has 
been selected by the law of the forum. Here again the law of the forum 
and the foreign law may entertain different views as to whether a pro-
vision of the foreign law is to be regarded as substantive or procedural, 
a decision upon which the applicability of different laws may depend. 
How is this question to be determined? 
It should be noted that in each of the above classes of cases the choice 
of law depends upon the qualification problem. If the problem is answered 
on the basis of the law of the forum, one law becomes applicable; if it is 
answered on the basis of the lex causae, another law determines the 
solution of the case. By limiting this discussion to these three classes, 
it will be possible to deal with the subject of qualification without running 
over the entire field of the Conflict of Laws, and to give some sort of 
unity and cohesion to the treatment. 
The assertion has been made that real qualification questions have been 
presented in only a few cases and that the problem is therefore devoid 
of practical interest.3 The enthusiastic discussion which the qualification 
problem has evoked has been ascribed as due largely to an unrealistic 
approach to the Conflict of Laws, principally exhibited by the adherents 
of the "logistic school." This school, it is said, attempts to perpetuate· 
3. Nussbaum, Book Review (1940) 40 CoL. L. Rev. 1461, 1468-1469. 
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an international point of view in the Conflict of Laws on grounds of 
pure logic after it has become apparent that the law of nations cannot 
furnish an adequate basis.4 It is true that there have been, relatively 
speaking, only a few decisions in which a court has been clearly con-
fronted with the necessity of choosing between the qualification of the 
forum and a qualification which would be different under the lc:t: causae. G 
As between states and countries belonging to the common law group, 
the categories in which fact-situations are grouped are generally the same, 
so that there is usually little occasion for the problem of qualification, 
although even here cases of this sort have presented tl1emselves. The 
problem may readily arise, however, where the common law comes into 
contact with the civil law. It has practical, as well as scientific, importance 
and for that reason deserves consideration. 
Both Kahn and Bartin concluded that no uniform solution could be 
found whicl1 would answer the above problems and tl1at each forun1 
would have to deal with them on tl1e basis of its own internal law. 
Despagnet attempted to bring about uniformity by suggesting that the 
questions be referred to the le.1; causae~ the law governing tl1e legal trans-
action in question.6 Another writer, Gemma, realizing, no doubt, the 
impossibility of qualifying legal transactions by the le.1: causae (i.e., on 
the basis of some law which remains yet to be ascertained), proposed to 
reach uniformity among the different countries by qualifying legal trans-
actions with reference to the requirements of international life.7 
My own reactions to the problem in tl1e light of tl1e existing Anglo-
American decisions were set forth in an article published in 1920, in 
which I agreed in the main with tl1e conclusions of Kahn and Bartin, 
that there is generally no escape from applying the internal law of the 
forun1 to the qualification of legal transactions.8 In common with some 
foreign writers, however, I favored these e.xceptions : ( 1) that the 
qualification of rights affecting tangible property should be made on the 
4. Id. at 1469, 1470. 
5. Nussbaum cites the following: Harral v. Wallis, 37 N.J. Eq. 458 (1SS3), afi'd 
sub nom. Harral v. Harral, 39 N. J. Eq. 279 (1884) (domicile); Wood & Sclicl: v. 
Compagnie Gem!rale Transatlantique, 43 F. (2d) 941 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930) (statute of 
limitations); University of Chicago v. Dater, 277 Mich. 658, 270 N. W. 175 (1936) 
(contract, lex loci contractus); St Louis-S. F. R. R. v. Fox, 171 Ark. 103, 283 S. \V. 
31 (1926) (settlement of injury claim rescinded, mode of tender); cf. Ronmrsot;, Cn.-.r:-
ACTERIZATION IN THE CoNFLicr OF LAws (1940) 157-222, 235-279 (hereinafter cited as 
RoBERTSON); New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. Y. Spence, 104 F. (2d) G{)5 (C. C. A. 
2d, 1939). 
6. Des conflits de lois relatifs d Ia qualijicatio1~ des rapports juridiqucs, 25 Ounet 
253, 261, 262; also PREciS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRlVE (1909) 353 ct seq. 
7. PROPEDEUTICA AL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO (1899) 91, 1ll-ll2. 
8. The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws (1920) 20 Cc.L. L. IW.•. 
247. 
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basis of the lex rei sitae,9 and (2) that if the forum is interested in a 
case only insofar as it is the place of trial, the courts of the forum should 
follow a qualification agreed upon by the foreign states or countries 
concerned.10 
Since 1920, the continental literature on the subject has assumed vast 
proportions.11 The great majority of writers have been forced to agree 
with Kahn and Bartin; and Despagnet's view that the le.-r causae should 
determine the question has found but a very few followers.12 Gemma's 
attempt to supplant the use of the internal law both of the lex fori and 
of the lex causae with a consideration of the international requirements 
has led to some important developments in recent years. The most out-
standing effort in this direction has been made by Rabel.13 According 
to this eminent writer, it is a mistake to assume that the sole background 
of a choice-of-law rule is the material law of the forum. Each country's 
rules of private international law are designed, in his view, to bring about 
international harmony between the law of the forum and that of all other 
countries, which can be attained only on the basis of more abstract notions 
than the concrete institutions of any particular country. Notwithstanding 
great diversities in the legal institutions of civilized countries, Rabel 
contends, they generally resemble each other sufficiently to permit the 
creation of more abstract notions which are valid for all national legis-
lations. By way of illustration he takes the subject of "Guardianship" 
referred to in Article 23 of the Introductory Law of the German Civil 
Code, which he would understand as an abstract notion of guardianship 
derived from a comparative study of the institution in the entire civilized 
world instead of as referring merely to guardianship as understood in 
German internal law. Rabel admits that the method of comparative law 
will not resolve the problem of qualification in those cases where the 
differences between the legislations are so great that it is impossible to 
set up a compromise between the opposing points of view. 
9. See, in general, Falconbridge, Contract a11d Conveyauce in the Conflict of Laws 
(1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 661, 663-666, 682-683; Characteri:;ation in tile Conflict of 
Laws (1937) 53 L. Q. REV. 235, 543; Conflict of Laws: Examples of Charactcriaaliotl 
(1937) 15 CAN. B. REv. 215, 234; RoBERTSON 190 et seq. 
10. Accord, RoBERTSON 177. If all the operative facts occurred in a single foreign 
country the law of that country would, of course, control without regard to whether the 
question was characterized in one way or another. The only exception to the rule would 
be for matters which the law of the forum would deem to be procedural. 
11. For the bibliography, see RoBERTSON xxv-xxix; for a representation in English 
of the Italian viewpoint, see Meriggi, Co11jlicts of Law-A Theoretical Approach (1934) 
14 B. U. L. REV. 319. 
12. E.g., \VOLFF, lNTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT (1933) 37; PACCHIONI, DJIUTTO 
INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO (2d ed. 1935) 173. 
13. Das Problem der Q11alijikation (1931) 5 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR Aust.ii.NDISCHES UND 
INTERNATIONALES PruvATRECHT 241. Republished in revised form in Italian: II Prob-
lema della Q!1a/ijicazio11e (1932) 2 Rrv. INT. DI DIR. PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE 97, and in 
French: Le Probleme de Ia Q11alijication ( 1933) 28 REV. DE DR. INT. Pruv.E 1. 
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In 1930 Bartin 14 added the following limitation to his original thesis 
that the lex fori governed the qualification of legal transactions: "After 
the law of the forum, on the basis of its own qualification, has chosen 
a foreign law as governing a particular legal institution, all subsidiary 
qualifications arising thereafter and necessary for the decision of the 
case are determined by the foreign law." 
In 1932 Neuner15 published the first monograpli on the subject, in 
which he rejected all the foregoing conclusions, the problem of qualifi-
cation having, in his opinion, no right to existence. According to this 
author, the fundamental error consists in the assumption that there exists 
in each. country a body of choice-of-law rules which are applicable tu all 
situations that may be presented to a court, whereas there are actually 
only about twenty or thirty such rules, which are entirely inadequate for 
that purpose. The primary need is, therefore, the working out of addi-
tional rules, together with the further elaboration of the existing rules 
and their application in a manner calculated to bring about reasonable 
and just results.16 
Recently, English and American writers also have begun to take interest 
in the problem of qualification. Beginning with 1934, a series of articles 
which dealt with the subject appeared. The earliest was by Beckett,17 
who conceived the proper principle to be that the classification should be 
made on the basis of analytical jurisprudence and comparative law. Like 
Rabel, he felt that if the rules of Conflicts are to perform the function 
for which they are designed, they must be applied in a manner suitable 
for appreciating the character of tl1e rules and institutions of all legal 
systems. The conception of these rules must, therefore, be of a very 
general character, which can be derived only from analytical jurisprudence 
and comparative law. 
14. 1 PRINCII'ES DE DR- INT. PRIVE (1930) 235; La Doctri11c des Qualificatious c1 
ses rapports avec lc caractcrc natio11al des rcglcs d~t Co11/lit des Lois (1930) AcADt!,m; 
DE DR- INT., REc. DES CouRs I, 565-620. See also Maury, Rcglcs Ga:eralcs des Couflits 
de Lois (1936) ACADEMlE DE DR- INT., REc. DES CooRS III, 329, 493 et seq. 
15. DER SINN DER INTERNATIO::<ALPRIVATRECHTLICHEN NoRM, EI!~E KrunR DER 
QUALIFIKATIONSTHEORIE ( 1932). 
16. Neuner says that the Conflict of Laws rules are not as general as they are bl!-
lieved to be and as they must be deemed to be if they are to govern all cases. In his 
view they are only general propositions, the e."tent and application of which remain to 
be worked out. The case of Ogden v. Ogden, iufra p. 755, may serve as an illustration. 
According to Neuner the English courts never really adopted the broad rule that capacity 
to marry is governed by the law of domicile but adopted it only with respect to pro-
hibited degrees of relationship. As the law of the place of celebration in all other respects 
governs marriage in English law, it would therefore also apply to the question of parent-
al consent. Such an interpretation of the English law would, of course, eliminate the 
qualification problem. 
17. Tlze Question of Classification ("Qualification'') in Private Iutcrnatioual Law 
(1934) 15 BRIT. Y. B. INT. L. 46. 
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Beckett's conclusions were accepted by Cheshire in the first edition of 
his textbook in 1935.18 In the second edition in 1938,1° Cheshire draws 
a distinction between primary classification, arising before the law ap· 
plicable to the case is selected, and secondary classification, which arises 
after the selection of such law.20 He would determine the former with 
reference to the lex fori and the latter with reference to the le.-r causae. 
This division corresponds to Bartin's later views. 
In 1940 Robertson published a comprehensive monograph on Charac-
terization in the Conflict of Laws.21 As his work contains a detailed 
examination of the views of all Anglo-American writers, and. of the 
most important continental writers, as \veil as a discussion of most 
English and American cases presenting fact situations involving the 
problem of characterization, our further development of the subject will 
center its attention upon the conclusions reached by this author. 
II. 
Falconbridge was the first writer to suggest that the problem of quali-
fication should be considered in connection with each of the different stages 
presented in the solution of a Conflicts problem.22 Before a judge can 
select the choice-of-law rule applicable to a situation presented to him, 
he must know whether the question relates to contracts, torts, property, 
succession, or some other field. He will usually be quite sure of the 
category to which the question belongs. Many differences do exist, how-
ever, between the different systems of law in the classification of legal 
transactions, and the question is what a judge is to do when confronted 
with a situation treated variantly in different systems. Most writers seem 
to feel that in the present stage of our law there is no practical alternative 
to the application of the law of the forum.23 It is conceded that this is 
an undesirable state of affairs because different solutions will be reached 
in different countries having identical Conflicts rules. Vigorous efforts 
18. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1st ed. 1935) 14. 
19. I d. (2d ed. 1938) at 24-25. 
20. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw (2d ed. 1938) 30, 37. For a discussion 
of secondary classification, see p. 753 et seq. infra. 
21. For other articles on the subject by English and American writers, sec Falcon· 
bridge, Clzaracterizatio1~ i1~ the Conflict of Laws (1937) 53 L. Q. REV. 235, 537; Con· 
flict of Laws: Examples of Characterization (1937) IS CAN. B. REv. 215; Renvoi, 
Characterizati01~ and Acq11ired Rights (1939) 17 CAN. B. REv. 369; Unger, The Place 
of Classijicati01~ i1~ Private I11temational Law (1937) 19 BELLY ARD 3; Cheatham, lntcrtlal 
Law Disti1tctio11s i1~ the C01~flict of Laws (1936) 21 CoRN. L. Q. 570. 
22. Clzaracterizati01~ in the Conflict of Laws (1937) 53 L. Q. REV. 235, 236. 
23. Falconbridge is in accord, but he urges that in order to bring about reasonable 
economic or social results the process of selecting the proper law be rendered as flexible 
as possible. He suggests, therefore, that the characterization should be made in the light 
of all potentially applicable rules of law. Re11voi, Characterization and Acquired Rig!lls 
(1939) 17 CAN. B. REv. 369, 374-375. 
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have therefore been made to avoid this conclusion, but, except in one or 
two directions,24 no practical escapes have been found. 
Robertson is in general agreement with the above views but contends 
that further clarification is necessary concerning the process of quali-
fication by the lex fori. He makes particular objection to the statement 
that the qualification must be on the basis of the "internal" law of the 
forum.25 Unger called attention to tlus point in connection with two 
English cases.26 One involved a foreign contract unsupported by con-
sideration. The contract, being governed by the foreign law and valid 
there, was enforced in England. 27 If the court had applied the strictly 
internal law, whlch required that a contract be supported by Cl.msitl~ra­
tion, the fact-situation presented could not have been characterized as a 
contract. Unger holds, therefore, that it is sufficient if the case falls 
within the "analytical framework" of the legal system of the forum. The 
second case recognized the validity of a Russian marriage in England.23 
As a Russian marriage is terminable at will, it does not correspond to 
the English notion of marriage. Unger would say that the Russian mar-
riage was rightfully recognized in England because it fell within the 
English analytical framework concerning marriage. Robertson regards 
Unger's formulation of the rule as still too narrow because it does not 
include cases involving foreign institutions entirely unknown to the in-
ternal English law. Such a situation was presented to the House of Lords 
in the case of DeNicols v. Curlier.29 A French couple came to reside in 
England. At the husband's death, the widow claimed one-half of all the 
property acquired by the husband during the marriage, including the 
property acquired in England, basing her claim on the French matrimonial 
property regime. No such property regime was known to the internal 
English law. The House of Lords felt that the French law should con-
trol and, in so holding, recognized a foreign institution whlch did not 
exist in England and so could not fall within the framework of the 
English internal law. Robertson therefore concludes that, insofar as the 
characterization of foreign legal situations is determined by the le.-c fori, 
the term does not mean the strictly internal law of the forum, but a wider 
concept which needs to be worked out for purposes of the Conflict of 
Laws.30 This conclusion clearly seems to be correct. 
In my Article dealing with the statute of frauds,31 published in 1923, 
I was already aware tha_t qualification in accordance with the internal law 
24. See pp. 744-745 supra. 
25. RoBERTSON 29 et seq. 
26. Unger, sttPra note 21, at 7. 
27. Re Bonacina [1912] 2 Ch. 394 (C.A.). 
28. Nachimson v. Nachimson [1930] P. 217. 
29. [1900] A. c. 21. 
30. RoBERTSON 89. 
31. The Statute of Frauds and tire Conflict of Lau.•s (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 311. 
HeinOnline  -- 50 Yale L. J. 750 1940-1941
750 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50: 743 
of the forum would not do. In most instances the categories of internal 
law will also suffice for purposes of the Conflict of Laws but there are 
situations where they may not. In the Article referred to, I stated that 
the statute of frauds might well be classified as procedural for purposes 
of internal law and yet be substantive from the point of view of the 
Conflict of Laws.32 The clearest example of such a distinction in Anglo-
American law relates to "penal" laws. There have been many American 
decisions holding that a statute which gives a plaintiff damages in excess 
of the amount of his loss, or without reference to such amount or the 
cause of the loss, is a penal statute. The United States Supreme Court83 
and the English Privy Council34 have held, however, in Huntington v. 
Attrill that, for purposes of the Conflict of Laws, an international test 
should be adopted, restricting the definJtion of a penal law to a law 
pimishing a person for the infraction of a public law. Here we have 
two distinct tests of what constitutes a penal law, one for internal law 
purposes and the other for questions of the Conflict of Laws. Similarly, 
as regards the qualification of legal transactions, the classification or 
characterization may have to be upon a broader or narrower basis than 
the internal law of the forum if it is to be suitable for the needs of the 
Conflict of Laws. In certain cases it may suffice, as suggested by Unger, 
that the transaction fall within the analytical framework of the internal 
law of the forum. In other cases it may not, so that wider categories 
may have to be discovered.3u To this end a knowledge of Comparative 
Law may be useful. 
III. 
Let us consider next the characterization of the connecting factor. 
After having reached the conclusion that the situation presented to the 
court is one of succession, or one of contracts or torts, the judge will be 
directed by the choice-of-law rules of the forum to apply the law of the 
domicile, the lex loci contractus, the lex loci solutionis, or the le.1: loci 
delicti, respectively. He may find, however, in a given case that different 
meanings are attached to such connecting factors. For example, the 
English courts recognize the reverter doctrine in connection with domicile. 
Our courts do not. In the English law a married woman cannot acquire 
32. Id. at 330. 
33. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657 (1892). 
34. Huntington v. Attrill [1893] A. C. 150 (P.C.). 
35. In the cases used by way of illustration above, the characterization of the situa-
tion as "contract," "marriage,'' or "penal" may not have determined the choice of law 
within the strict meaning of the qualification problem as defined in this article. The 
question was in fact only whether a wide or a narrow meaning should be given to the 
terms in connection with the enforcement of the foreign "contract," or "penal" liability, 
or the recognition of the foreign "marriage." The same reasoning is valid, however, 
where a choice of law is dependent upon the qualification problem as herein defined. 
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a separate domicile. Under our law she may. Under our law a contract 
by correspondence is deemed concluded when the letter of acceptance is 
posted. On the continent and in Latin-America, the formation of the 
contract is not infrequently postponed to the time when the answer reaches 
the offeror. Differences exist also with respect to the place of performance 
of a contract or the place where a tort is committed. On the continent 
the qualification of nationality as a connecting factor is of great im-
portance because in many countries tlte le:r patriae has been substituted 
for the lex domicilii in the determination of the personal law. As the 
laws governing the acquisition and loss of nationality vary considerably 
in the different countries, by what law is the judge to determine the 
nationality of the parties before him? I dealt with this problem in an 
earlier Article,36 and, as it has little practical importance in the Anglo-
American system of the Conflict of Laws, it need not be reconsidered here. 
Apart from the qualification of "nationality," it may be said that there 
appears to be general concurrence, at least among Anglo-American courts 
and writers,37 that the law of the forum must determine the meaning of 
the connecting factors. Where a person lives in a single foreign country, 
it is, of course, quite simple to determine his domicile with reference to 
sucll foreign law. Difficulties would arise, however, if he were to live 
in several foreign countries unless there were agreement between those 
countries regarding his domicile. So far as the question has been presented 
to Anglo-American courts, they have determined domicile in accordance 
with the lex fori. 38 ·whether they would accept the common character-
ization of two foreign states to which the factual situation was e.xclusively 
related, the law of the forum being interested solely as the place of trial, 
is not certain.39 The foreign characterization might well be adopted in 
this situation in the interest of uniformity, as there is no inescapable 
necessity for applying the law of the forum. Similarly, with respect to 
the remaining factors. Thus in a contract case, if the law in a given 
jurisdiction directs the judge to apply the law of the place of contracting 
and the contract is deemed concluded by the le:t: fori in the state or country 
in which the acceptance is mailed and the law of the foreign state regards 
it as formed when the acceptance reaches tlte offeror, tl1e law of the 
forum would necessarily have to control. However, if the law of the 
forum should have no other relation to the case than as the place of 
trial, and the la\vs of the foreign countries between which the negotia-
tions were carried on should agree tlmt a contract is completed at the 
36. Tlze Theory of Q11alijicatious aud the Couflict of La·ws (1920) 20 Cm- L. lw:. 
247, 250-252. 
37. For a discussion of the English and American cases, sec Rom:rrrsm: 224-:?29. 
38. See RoBERTSON 108; Lorenzen, Sll/'ra note 36, at 248-250; RESTt.n:~.m~:T, Co~•­
FLicr OF LAws (1934) § 10. 
39. See RESTATEMENT, Co:r.'FI.lcr OF LAWS (1934) § 10, caveat. 
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place where the acceptance reaches the offeror, uniformity in the Conflict 
of Laws would be promoted by accepting the foreign characterization. 
Where the connecting factor has significance in the internal law of the 
country as well, it should conform for the purposes of the Conflict of 
Laws, to the international requirements, instead of being limited to the 
internal law concept. Our courts have shown an awareness of this fact 
in connection with domicile when they contrast "municipal" domicile 
with domicile for purposes of the Conflict of Laws.40 
Robertson agrees that the connecting factor should generally be deter-
mined by the law of the forum. As he is inclined to accept the renvoi 
doctrine in the Conflict of Laws, he would, insofar as that doctrine 
applies, allow an exception to the above rule and accept the character-
ization of the connecting factor by the foreign law.41 He gives as an 
illustration the case of an American citizen with a domicile of ol-igin 
in Iowa who acquires a domicile of choice in England. He then decides 
to give up his English domicile and return to the United States to end 
his days. He dies on his way home. An English court is called upon to 
administer his estate. By English law the decedent died domiciled in Iowa 
because the domicile of origin automatically reverted upon the abandon-
ment of his English domicile. By Iowa law, the decedent died domiciled 
in England because his English domicile of choice continued until a new 
domicile was established in Iowa. If, in the light of In re Annesley,42 
the English judge is to decide the case in the same way as the judge 
sitting in the court of the domicile would do, he will have to follow the 
reference of Iowa law to English law in the matter of domicile. He would 
thus have to accept the determination of the connecting factor-domicile 
-by the Iowa court, instead of reaching a conclusion on the basis of 
the English law of domicile. 
The case of University of Chicago v. Dater43 may he explained on 
this basis. A married woman in Michigan signed a note, dated and pay-
able in Chicago, and secured by Illinois real estate. According to Michigan 
law, the contract was deemed concluded in Illinois. But when it was 
proved that under the Illinois rule as to the formation of contracts the 
contract was deemed concluded in Michigan, the Michigan court applied 
its own rule that the married woman was under a disability to enter 
into the contract. The majority opinion does not disclose any awareness 
of the problem involved. The dissenting opinion, on the other hand, 
clearly expresses the usual view toward this question. If, under the 
40. "This is an illustration applicable to a change of municipal domicile. But the 
domicile required by the divorce statute seems to be more analogous to what is termed 
by Mr. Jacobs, in his work on Domicile, a quasi-national domicile." King v. King, 74 
N. J. Eq. 824, 827, 71 Atl. 687, 688 (1908). 
41. RoBERTSON 110. 
42. [1926] Ch. 692. 
43. 277 Mich. 658, 270 N. W. 175 (1936). 
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Michigan Conflicts rule, the law of the place where the contract was 
technically made determined the capacity of married women to contract, 
the Michigan court was obliged, of course, to ascertain where under the 
circumstances of the case the contract was made. This question the court 
resolved correctly on the basis of tl1e Michigan decisions. The connecting 
factor was thereby established and there was no occasion to determine 
it over again on the basis of Illinois law. Therefore tl1e court should 
have applied the Illinois law governing tlte capacity of married women 
to contract unless it was prepared to accept, with respect to contracts, 
the renvoi doctrine in the In re Amzesley sense. Under tlte Amwsley rule, 
the Michigan court should decide the case as tlte Illinois court would. 
It would be immaterial how tl1e Illinois court reached its conclusion that 
Michigan law was applicable: whether it did so because its Conflict of 
Laws rule regarding capacity to contract was different from that of 
Michigan (it might determine such capacity with reference to the law 
of the domicile of the married woman), or whetlter the Conflicts rule 
regarding capacity to contract was tl1e same as tl1e Michigan rule but 
the Illinois court disagreed witl1 tlte Michigan court's characterization of 
the connecting factor as the place of contracting. 
A word of caution may be in order here. Although a goodly number 
of decisions and dicta in England seem to accept renvoi, there is no 
clear-cut decision by a higher court which really establishes the doctrine 
in English law. It should also be remembered that the English renvoi 
cases have been almost e.xclusively concerned with matters of succession 
where the English rule of domicile came into conflict with the continental 
rule of nationality. 1\·Ioreover, even as limited to succession cases, the 
I1t re Annesley rule is only one of several interpretations which the English 
lower courts have given to tl1e renvoi doctrine. Uniform results arose 
in In re Annesley from tl1e fact that the French courts did not interpret 
their renvoi doctrine in the way the English court did. If the interpre-
tation given to the renvoi doctrine by In re Amzesley is the true one on 
principle, it must be correct for every other country. If the French courts 
had interpreted their renvoi doctrine in tl1e same way as In rt: Amreslt:y, 
they would have had to decide the case in the same manner as an English 
court, and if an English court had to decide in the same way as a French 
court, no conclusion could have been reached. As long as some countries 
apply the renvoi doctrine in tlte French way, which is the traditional one, 
uniformity would be reacl1ed, with reference to those countries, on the 
basis of the In re Amzesley doctrine. Personally, I cannot approve a 
doctrine which is workable only if the otl1er country rejects it. .\part 
from that, I do not favor handing over our Conflicts problem~ to so-called 
e:x.-perts on foreign private international law. It is difficult enough to get 
accurate e.-....-pert testimony with respect to foreign municipal law, but such 
testimony is much more unreliable with respect to foreign Conflict of 
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Laws. For these reasons I should still regard the general acceptance of 
the renvoi doctrine in our law as most unfortunate. 
IV. 
We come now to the third step in the solution of a Conflict of Laws 
problem, which is called by Robertson "The delimitation and application 
of the proper law." 44 In a case involving the distribution of personal 
property upon death, an Anglo-American court would find the connecting 
factor to be the decedent's domicile at the time of death and, character-
izing this term on the basis of the lex for£, it might conclude that the 
domicile was in France. In a contract case, let us assume that a court 
has found it to be the settled law of the state that the law of the place 
of contracting controls, and, characterizing this connecting factor on the 
basis of the lex fori, let us assume that the court has found that the place 
of contracting was in France. In both instances the question will then 
be what is the French law that is to be applied? If the French law should 
have rules of the Conflict of Laws different from those of the forum, 
applying the national law of the decedent to questions of succession and 
the intention of the parties as governing the validity of the contract, we 
should be faced again with the renvoi doctrine, that is, whether the law 
of the forum should regard its Conflicts rules as referring to the French 
municipal or internal law (law of succession or contracts), exclusive of 
its rules of the Conflict of Laws, or the French law in its totality, includ-
ing its rules of the Conflict of Laws. This assumes, of course, that the 
question is not regarded by the courts of the forum as one of procedure 
in the Conflicts sense. If it should be· so regarded, the procedural rules 
of the forum would apply. 
This is not the place to go further into the subject of renvoi in general. 
So far as it bears upon the question of characterization arising in con-
nection with the third step in the solution of a Conflicts problem - the 
application and delimitation of the foreign law - it operates in the same 
manner as it operates in dealing with the qualification of the connecting 
factor. In other words, if the renvoi doctrine in the In re Amtesley sense 
is adopted by the law of the forum, the court would have to regard itself 
in the above cases as sitting in France and decide the case as a French 
court would decide it. 45 If a question of qualification were involved, it 
would mean, of course, that the law of the forum would follow the de-
cision of the French court. To the extent, therefore, that the law of the 
forum accepts the renvoi in the In re Attnesley sense, any qualification 
44. ROBERTSON 17-18. 
45. Falconbridge is of the opinion that the renvoi doctrine should be recognized with 
respect to status, and for that reason he would justify characterization of status on the 
basis of the foreign law governing such status. Characterization in the Conflict of Laws 
(1937) 53 L. Q. REv. 235, 544-546; Conflict of Laws: Examples of Characterization 
(1937) 15 CAN. B. REv. 215, 244. 
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arising in the application or delimitation of the French law would actually 
be determined by the lex causae. 
As the renvoi doctrine has not been recognized in American law. except 
for certain purposes, let us consider the characterization problem arising 
in connection with the third step in the solution of a Conflict of Laws 
problem (the application and delimitation of the foreign law) on the 
assumption that the Conflicts rules of the forum apply strictly to the 
internal law of the foreign country and not to its Conflicts rules. 
Robertson calls this the problem of secondary classification and argues 
that secondary classification should be on the basis of the lex caust1c-
on principle, and not merely by way of e.xception, as in the case of primary 
characterization. He thus accepts Bartin's later generalization;10 accord-
ing to which the law of the forum disinterests itself in the case after 
it has chosen the foreign law and turned the case over to such law, so 
that any problem of characterization arising in the application of the 
foreign law will be governed by that law. Cheshire drew the same dis-
tinction between questions of characterization arising before and after 
the foreign law has been chosen by the lex fori. 'Ve find, however, that 
these supporters of the secondary classification theory do not agree among 
themselves as to the types of cases whicl1 are subject to secondary char-
acterization. Robertson goes beyond Cheshire, by including in tl1is class 
the question whether a legal provision relates to capacity or formalities. 
The two cases generally discussed in this connection by writers on the 
qualification problem are a Dutch will case and the English case of 
Ogden v. OgdenY The former involved a holographic will made by a 
Hollander in France,48 the Dutcl1law prohibiting Hollanders from execut-
ing their wills in the holographic form either at home or abroad.43 Bartin 
originally regarded this situation as one in which no uniformity of 
decision could be reached, on the assumed ground tl1at from the Dutch 
point of view the question would be one of capacity while from the stand-
point of French law it would be one of formality.uo The Dutch courts 
would regard the will as void, whereas the courts of the country in which 
the will was executed or the courts of third countries might apply the 
law of the place of e.xecution to matters of formality and so hold the 
will valid. This viewpoint has had the approval botl1 of courts:;1 and 
46. Bartin, La Doctriuc des Qualifications ct ses rapports at·ec /c caraclcrc t:alicmal 
des regles dn Con/lit des Lois (1930) AdDE!>Uf: DE DR. INT., REc. DES Couns I, 565, W3. 
47. [1908] P. 46. 
48. A similar question is presented by the prohibition of joint wills, which is regard-
ed by some as appertaining to capacity and by others as appertaining to form. 
49. Holland: CIVIL CoDE (1921) art. 992. 
50. 24 Clunet 225, 229-230. 
51. Frauce: Cass. (Civ.) Aug. 25, 1847, Dalloz Jurisprudence, 1847 I. 273; Ger-
many: Hans. OLG, May 2, 1917, Hans. G.Z., 1917, Bcibl., 252. 
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writers. 52 Cheshire regards the problem as one of primary character-
ization, to be determined on the basis of the le.1: fori. 53 According to 
Robertson's theory of secondary characterization, if such a will, disposing 
of movable property, is executed in England, and the English courts 
regard the law of domicile as governing capacity to make a will and the 
law of the place of execution as governing formalities, the courts should 
inquire of the Dutch law what it understands by capacity and of the 
English law what it means by formalities. 54 Others have denied the 
validity of the will anywhere, either because they regarded the Dutch 
legislation as affecting capacity and therefore governed by the testator's 
personal (Dutch) law 50 or, conceding that the Dutch statute affected 
formalities, because they did not attribute an absolute character to the rule 
that the law of the place of e..xecution governed formalities, but regarded it, 
with respect to Dutch nationals, as subject to modification by the national 
legislation. 56 Bartin seems to have adopted this view in his later ·years. 57 
From the standpoint of the Dutch law, the will would be invalid without 
any need of characterizing the legislation as relating to capacity or to 
form. 58 The case presented, therefore, is in reality not at all a problem 
of differences in qualification. 
The facts in Ogden v. Ogdm were as follows: In 1898 a marriage was 
celebrated in England between Sarah, a domiciled Englishwoman, and 
Philip, a domiciled Frenchman, who was 19 years of age. In 1901 this 
marriage was annulled by a French court on the ground that the cot'lsent 
of Philip's surviving parent had not been obtained as required by French 
law. Philip subsequently married a French woman in France. Sarah 
thereupon, in 1903, instituted a suit in England for the dissolution of her 
marriage with Philip on the ground of his adultery and desertion. This 
suit was dismissed for want of jurisdiction because Philip was domiciled 
52. 1 ARMINJON, PRECIS DE DR. INT. PRIVE (2d eel. 1927) 135; 6 STAUDINGER's 
KoMMENTAR zullr BuRGERLICHEN GESETZDUCHE (Raapc's 9th ed. 1931), part II, 18. Sec 
also PILLET & NIDOYET, MANUEL DE DR. INT. PRIVE (1928) 503; Dt;st•AGNET, Puf:cts DB 
DR. !NT. PRIVE (5th eel. 1909) 354; SuRVILLE, Couus ELEMENTAIRE DB DR. IN·r. 
PRivE (7th ed. 1925) 19, n. 3. 
53. PRIVA'IE IN'IERNATIONAL LAw (2d ed. 1938), 34 cl seq. 
54. RoBERTSON 238, 244-245. 
55. In favor of this view: Fraucc: Dufour v. Dufour, Trib. Seine, Aug. 13, 1903, 
31 Clunet 166; Belgium: Willemsen v. Brands, Trib. Brussels, July 21, 1886, 14 Clunct 
495; Isabaert v. Barbiaux, Trib. Termonde, March 24, 1907, 35 Clunet 885; Froielbisc 
v. Horsten, App. Brussels, Jan. 9, 1937, Pas. 1937, II. 56. 
56. Fra11ce: Leeuwn v. Guilbot, Trib. Seine, Feb. 19, 1927, 55 Clunet 707; Italy: 
Ogtrop v. Formica, App. Genoa, Aug. 4, 1891, 20 Clunet 955, afj'd, Cass. Turin, Apr. 
12, 1892, 21 Clunet 1083. This would be tantamount to the recognition of a new choice· 
of-law rule with respect to formalities. 
57. Bartin, supra note 46, at 576. 
58. KosTERS, HET lNTERNATIONAAL BuRGERLIJ K RECHT IN NED£RLAND ( 1917) 643; 
Amsterdam, Rcchtbank, June 19, 1924, 12 Bull. de L'institut Intermediarc International 
118. 
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in France. In 1904 Sarah, describing herself as a widow, married Ogden, 
a domiciled Englishman, in England. In 1906 Ogden obtained an annul-
ment of the marriage on the ground that at the time of their marriage 
Sarah was married to Philip. So far as Ogde11 '<'. Ogdc11 held that the 
French decree of nullity was not entitled to recognition in England, it is 
deemed overruled by subsequent English cases. The case is principally 
of interest because of the problem of qualification involved in it and the 
decision that the requirement of parental consent to the marriage was 
to be characterized as a part of the formalities, so that the marriage 
between Sarah and Philip was validly contracted from the English point 
of view. 
Various solutions of the Ogden problem have been suggested. Beckett 
would give effect to all French provisions, though relating to fom1alities 
abroad, for the reason that they are matters of family law and intended 
for the protection of family interests.u9 Cheshireuo and Falconbridge01 
insist that the qualification of the French requirement must be according 
to the lex fori. Says Cheshire: 
"In order to reach a decision. he [the English judge] examines 
the terms in which the rule is e.xpressed, and he considers the con-
struction put upon it by French e.xpert witnesses, but he must 
ultimately determine its true nature by an application of the canons 
and principles recognized in England. If the rule reads as follows: 
'The son who has not reached the age of 25 years 
cannot contract marriage, without the consent of 
his father and mother,' 
it would seem that it must be classed as affecting the capacity of 
the parties. . . . If an English judge applies Frencl1 law merely 
because a French lawyet would regard the question sub judice as 
one of capacity, though in England it is regarded as one of formal 
validity, the result is the application of a legal system whicl1 in this 
country is considered inappropriate in the matter at hand." 0:! 
If the English rule that capacity to contract a marriage is governed 
by the law of domicile is a general one, its characterization should be 
on the basis of the lex fori and not on that of the lc:r causae. The ul-
timate question is whether French or English law is to be applied to the 
matter of consent of parents. The answer to the question depends upon 
59. Beckett, The Question of Classijicatiou (''Qualification") Ju Prit·atr llllen:a-
tioual Law (1934) 15 BRIT. Y. B. lxT. L. 46, 78. 
60. PRIVATE h."TERNATIONAL LAw (2d ed. 1938) 36. 
61. Clzaracteri::ation il~ tlze Conflict of Lau:s (1937) 53 L. Q. REv. 235, 249 (maintains 
that parental consent cannot be characterized in the abstract; that it may be a question 
of formality in one conte.'-1: and capacity in another). 
62. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw (2d ed. 1938) 36, 37. In applying the foreign law 
selected by the forum, the court should take into consideration all relevant pnl\isions, 
though they may appear in some other title or division of the Code. 
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whether the consent of parents is to be characterized as appertaining to 
capacity or form. This question the law of the forum must decide for 
itself. If the English judge were to submit to the French view in this 
situation and regard a French provision as one of capacity when from 
the English point of view it is a matter of form, he would, as Cheshire 
points out in the above quotation, apply a law which is considered inap-
propriate by the law of the forum. He would apply French law because 
of the French characterization when he should apply English law accord-
ing to the English characterization. As well might the English judge 
prefer the French to the English rules for the choice of law, i.e., accept 
the renvoi doctrine. Robertson appears to favor the renvoi and this no 
doubt accounts for his suggestion that in the case of multiple qualification 
(where, for example, capacity is governed by the law of domicile and 
formalities by the law of the place where the transaction occurs), the 
characterization should be on the basis of the lex causae (i.e., the domi-
ciliary law should characterize capacity and the lex loci actus should 
characterize matters of form). That suggestion is unacceptable. 
Both Cheshire and Robertson assume that there is an established rule 
in the English Conflict of Laws that capacity to marry is governed by 
the law of domicile and formalities by the law of the place of celebration. 
If the English rule that the law of domicile controls the capacity to marry 
were of a more restricted character so as to be limited (as submitted by 
Neuner and Rheinstein 63 ) to degrees of relationship, all other matters 
being subject to the law of the place of celebration, the marriage in Ogden 
v. Ogden would of course have been valid in England, but no question 
of characterization would have been presented. 
The problem remains whether or not questions of qualification which 
may arise after the foreign law has been chosen by the le.-r fori should 
be referred to the foreign law ( le.-r cattsae) as Bartin, Cheshire and 
Robertson advocate. It goes without saying that if the qualification 
problem merely involves the application of the foreign internal law, the 
foreign law should control. The law of state X, which has been chosen 
by the law of the forum as governing a contract or tort, necessarily 
governs any subsidiary question relating to such contract or tort; for 
example, whether a particular contract is to be regarded as a loan or 
deposit, or whether the master is responsible for the torts of his servants, 
and what is meant by master and servant in that connection. It is also 
reasonable that if the French Civil Code permits Frenchmen to e.-cecute 
wills in the "authentic" "form abroad, the requirement may be deemed 
satisfied if the nearest equivalent existing in the place of execution is 
complied with (for example, where a will is executed in England before 
witnesses) . 
63. See Neuner, op. cit. supra note 15. Compare also Rheinstein, Book Review 
(1938) 8 BROOKLYN L. REv. 253, 257. 
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Does it follow that the lex causae should likewise determine whether a 
particular provision of the foreign law relates to substance or procedure? 
The principal examples of secondary qualification given by Cheshire relate 
to substance and procedure. Robertson also dwells at length upon this 
subject in his discussion of secondary characterization. According to 
these writers, if the law of the forum has decided that a contract or a 
tort is governed by the law of state X and no rules of procedure of the 
forum are involved, such questions as whether a writing required by 
the law of state X affects the formation and validity of the contract or 
relates to evidence, whether by the law of state X the running of the 
statute of limitations discharges a contract or merely bars the remedy 
for its breach, whether the failure to give notice to the wrong-doer re-
quired by the law of state X will discharge the cause of action or whether 
it is merely a procedural requirement for the bringing of the suit, should 
be governed by the law of state X. \\That are the consequences of this 
view? According to the proponents of the secondary classification theory, 
if the law of the forum says that the statute of limitations is substantive 
and the law governing the contract says it is procedural, the action would 
be maintainable, even though it is not brought within the time prescribed 
by either law. 64 The statute of limitations of the forum would be ap-
plicable only to contracts governed by the law of the forum and the 
foreign statute of limitations, being procedural, would be disregarded. 
as the courts do not enforce the procedural laws of another country. The 
same would be true in the case of the statute of frauds. If the law of 
the forum says it is substantive and the law governing the contract says 
it is procedural, the contract would be enforceable upon reasoning similar 
to that used in connection with the statute of limitations, although neither 
statute is satisfied. 65 If the law of the forum should have a substantive 
64. This is the view taken by Cheshire and Robertson. To the srune effect with 
respect to the Statute of Frauds, see WHARTON, COh"FLlcr OF L:.ws (3d cd. 1905) 1445. 
If it should be asked why, under the secondary classification theory, the characterization 
by the foreign law of the Statute of Limitations or of the Statute of Frauds as pro~:cd­
ural was not binding upon the courts of the forum so as to make the statute of the 
forum applicable, the answer is, because the law of the forum, in submitting the matter 
to the foreign law, has thereby already decided that the question is one u£ substance. 
Procedural matters are always subject to the law of the forum. 
65. The German Supreme Court took this view in a suit upon a Tennessee contract. 
The German statute (3 years) did not apply because it was regarded as substantive and 
thus applicable only to contracts governed by German law. The Tennessee statute (6 
years) was found to be procedural from the viewpoint of American law and hence not 
applicable. There being no statute of limitations applicable to the situation, the action 
was allowed. German Supreme Court, January 4, 1882, 7 RGZ 21. Later cases ha\·e 
taken the view advocated in this Article: that the foreign statute be qualified on the basis 
of the law of the forum. After a detailed comparison between the effects of the foreign 
statute and the German statute of limitations the court found that they were substan-
tially the same. That being the case, it felt that the case could be dealt with on the basis 
of German law, which had rejected the notion, formerly prevailing, that the statute of 
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rule requiring notice of the injury suffered by the plaintiff and the law 
of the place where the injury arose should regard the requirement of 
notice as a matter of procedure, the action would lie, although no notice 
was given, that is, neither law was complied with. If the law of the 
forum should regard the burden of proof as substantive and the law of 
the state where the wrong was committed should regard it as procedural, 
there would theoretically be no law applicable to the burden of proof.00 
Results like these would seem sufficient to prove the unsoundness of 
the secondary classification theory. If an applicable foreign statute of 
frauds or statute of limitations has not been satisfied, the plaintiff has 
no right to damages for the breach of the contract under the law govern-
ing the contract. If this is so, there is no reason why the plaintiff should 
be given greater rights in any other state. The very object of the rules 
of the Conflict of Laws is to keep the rights of parties the same, regard-
less of the state or country in which the litigation may take place. If 
the law of the forum chooses the law of state X as governing the con-
tractual rights of the parties, it does so on considerations of fairness and 
justice. If the law of the foreign state or country says that the plaintiff 
never had an enforceable right, he should not have an enforceable right 
anywhere else. An unenforceable right is equivalent for purposes of the 
Conflict of Laws to no right. The statement that courts should enforce 
foreign substantive rights but not foreign procedural laws has no justi-
fiable basis if the so-called procedural law would normally affect the 
outcome of the litigation. If there is any sense in the proposition that 
the law of state X governs the contract- and if there is no sense in 
that proposition, the entire Conflict of Laws should be scrapped- it must 
mean that all municipal laws of the state normally affecting the rights 
of the parties (that is, the recovery of damages), such as the statute of 
frauds and the statute of limitations, should control. 
The parties cannot, of course, expect the courts of the forum to adapt 
their legal machinery to that of any foreign state or country. So far as 
the detailed steps and modes of procedure are concerned, courts can 
operate only in their accustomed manner. A Connecticut court cannot 
without undue inconvenience try a case in accordance with New York 
procedure and it would be quite impossible to try a case in accordance 
with a continental or Latin-American system of procedure. The law of 
the forum is thus obliged, on grounds of necessity, to apply its own pro-
limitations belongs to the law of procedure. RG, Nov. 21, 1910, Juristische Wochcn-
schrift 1911, 148; July 6, 1934, 145 RGZ 121. 
Nussbaum regards the analysis and appraisal of the integration process-the process 
of determining whether the foreign ilistitution conforms substantially to that of the forum 
-as constituting the central problem of qualification, which is rarely touched upon by the 
writers on the subject. Book Review (1940) 40 CoL. L. REv. 1461, 1465; cj. Wood & 
Selick v. Compagnie Gem!rale Transatlantique, 43 F. (2d) 941 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930). 
66. In this predicament the court would probably apply the law of the forum. 
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cedurallaws and disregara those of other states. However, foreign stat-
utes of limitations and statutes of frauds do not fall within that category, 
for they can be proved as readily and without greater inconvenience than 
any other foreign law that may be applicable under the rules of the 
Conflict of Laws of the forum. 
v. 
vVe have arrived, then, at the following conclusions: 
(1) The question whether a situation is to be classified as one of 
contracts, torts, succession, matrimonial property, and the like, is neces-
sarily to be determined by the law of the forum. The foreign institution 
need not conform strictly to the internal law of the forum; it should 
be sufficient if it falls within its analytical framework or within some 
special concept worked out for purposes of the Conflict of Laws. 
(2) The same conclusion applies to the cltaracterization of the con-
necting factor. However, to the C."(tent that the taw of the forum accepts 
the renvoi doctrine in the In re Amzesley sense, the characterization of 
the connecting factor by the foreign law would prevail. 
(3) As the law of the forum 'is chosen in the above classes of cases 
for want of any other practicable rule, it should be abandoned whenever 
some other reasonable solution can be found. For that reason the question 
whether tangible property is movable or immovable should be determined 
on the basis of the law of the situs. Again, if the fact situation is e.'\:-
clusively connected with foreign states or countries, the law of the fomm 
being interested solely as the place of trial, a common characterization 
placed upon it by the law of all the foreign states or countries involved 
should be accepted. 
To the extent that the law of the forum understands its Conflicts roles 
in the renvoi (In re Annesley) sense, the adoption of the characterization 
made by the foreign law would follow. 
( 4) The suggestion that the le."t" causae should determine all questions 
of characterization arising after the foreign law has been selected by the 
lex fori- the "secondary characterization" of Cheshire and Robertson -
is not to be approved. As in the preceding cases, such questions of char-
acterization should be resolved on the basis of the lc:r fori. 
